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Michael Mason and Aarti Gupta 
The starting- point for tThis volume book was an academic interest inhas 
sought to understanding the rise and effects of a “transparency turn” in global 
environmental governance. Across a range of environmental issue- areas, a 
call for transparency informs actor expectations and institutional rules, 
expressed in practice by diverse governance forms. The preceding chapters 
featured a variety of cases of environmental governance in which information 
disclosure is employed to steer the behavior of selected actors—what, 
following Gupta, we label “governance by disclosure” (2008).  
As is clear from these preceding contributions, the global descriptor is used in 
a relational sense. Itour analysis of governance by disclosure takes stock of 
environmental governance initiatives, led by both state and non-state actors, 
constructed at the international or transnational scale by cross-border 
regulation or other means of coordinated steering, and facilitated by 
information and communications technology, including web-based publicity 
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and functionality. This global scaling encompasses vertical and horizontal 
alignments of decision-making authority, which recasts, rather than displaces, 
national policy spaces (Andonova and Mitchell 2010). 
This bears affinities with wider scholarship on multi-layered or multi-
level governance (Bache and Finders 2004; Enderlein et al. 2010; Piattoni 
2010), in the sense that all the contributors to this volume book identify 
complex configurations of transparency practices across jurisdictional 
boundaries. Even Part part II 2 of this volume book on state-led multilateral 
transparency initiatives, which might be expected to mirror state-centered 
tenets of public international law, reveals disclosure modalities with 
innovative forms of governance—from the public compliance mechanism of 
the Aarhus Convention to the risk-based information management deployed in 
global rule- making on pesticides and genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs). These cases illustrate vertical scalings of inter-state authority re-
negotiated according to specific transparency demands from coalitions of state 
and civil society actors. As noted belowin the followingA common finding, 
however, is that the resultant disclosure regimes are skewed in operation by 
market interests: insofar as multilateral disclosure of environmental 
information targets profit-driven business actors, states are often obliged to 
defer to powerful corporate constituencies. 
The chapters in Part part III 3 encompass examples of horizontal (or 
“networked”) multi-level governance, where in which disclosure regimes are 
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mainly coordinated by, and targeted at, non-state actors; , respectively, global 
sustainability reporting, carbon disclosure, energy governance, environmental 
certification programs, and private investment projects in developing 
countries. These cases are emblematic of multi-level governance forms, 
insofar as they feature task-specific, flexible steering with voluntary or 
contractual lines of accountability. Nevertheless, these analyses diverge as 
well from the functionalist claims of governance theory, by treating 
information disclosure as more than just a regulatory strategy or means of 
organizational learning. They share with the other contributions to this volume 
book a critical theoretical perspective, one that problematizes the transparency 
turn by examining its differential development within broader political 
economic and discursive contexts, notably the unstable global dominance of 
market liberalism. 
By embracing a critical take, the authors in this volume book also 
collectively acknowledge the unavoidable normativity (value-laden structure) 
and materiality of governance by disclosure. As Mol argues in chapter 2, the 
normative kinship often assumed between transparency and ideas of 
democracy does not necessarily correspond in practice with the disclosure 
regimes favored by private and state actors. A number of chapters respond to 
his thesis that transparency has “lost its innocence” in environmental 
governance: whether or not the authors accept this claim, there is common 
empirical interest in uncovering the normative background and content of 
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selected transparency initiatives. Across the chapters, there is also an 
analytical concern with the materiality of transparency—the ways in which 
governance by disclosure is shaped by the (potential) environmental harm 
being governed and its location in wider circuits of material production and 
consumption. This is most evident in emerging issue- areas of environmental 
rule making, as because governance responses crystallize around novel 
problems and risk profiles. This is illustrated in the efforts to find disclosure 
settings adequate to the challenges of governing transgenic crops, genetic 
resources, and forestry-related climate mitigation actions (reducing emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation—REDD+) in developing countries. 
In these examples, what to be made transparent is subject to intense political 
negotiation, largely because the scope and content of environmental 
information (and its disclosure) generates uneven costs and benefits. 
From these shared points of departure, the contributors to this volume 
book address the three research questions outlined in the introduction: Why 
transparency now? How is transparency being institutionalized? What effects 
(normative, procedural, and substantive) is it having? They also consider the 
working hypotheses attached to each question. These include: H1—adoption 
of transparency in global environmental governance is driven by 
democratization and marketization; H2—institutionalization of transparency 
decenters state-led regulation and opens up political space for new actors; and 
H3—transparency is more likely to be effective under contexts resonant with 
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the goals and decision processes of both both disclosers and recipients. The 
response of the contributors to these research questions and hypotheses allows 
enables us now to offer concluding observations on the transparency turn in 
global environmental governance in this chapter. What follows is a 
comparative review of their findings on the uptake, functioning, and effects of 
transparency as information disclosure. 
Embracing Transparency 
Throughout this volumebook, there is a methodological sensitivity to the 
historicity of governance trajectories featuring transparency as information 
disclosure. Within particular issue- areas, governance by disclosure is, of 
course, influenced by context-dependent conditions and events, in which 
multiple participants, with differential resource endowments and capabilities, 
move to support, shape, or oppose specific transparency norms and practices. 
Nevertheless, in corroboration of H1, there is strong evidence from the 
chapters that democratization and marketization are leading societal drivers of 
the uptake of transparency in global environmental governance, al though the 
marketization logic, as we elaborate belowin the followingsubsequently argue, 
tends to dominate and is often in tension with ideas of democratic 
accountability. 
By itself, the democratization driver is by no means straightforward in 
scope and content. Given that most chapters acknowledge close linkages 
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between the transparency turn and democratization, it is tempting to conclude 
that information disclosure regimes derive from, or foster, liberal democratic 
structures of decision- making; , for example, the rapid diffusion of 
transparency in the new democracies of central Central and eastern Eastern 
Europe. Yet as Florini and Jairaj show in their context-setting chapter 3, the 
freedom-of-information laws and regulations of liberal democracies are not 
the only precursors of information disclosure in global environmental 
governance, as because environmental information disclosure has also 
appeared selectively in closed political systems, notably China. Indeed, they 
identify transnational learning as an autonomous influence of the cross-
national uptake of information disclosure.  
In his chapter on the Aarhus Convention, Mason similarly notes that 
while although states and international organizations have played a significant 
role in spreading liberal democratic framings of transparency, other (social 
democratic) understandings are evident as well in promoting uptake of 
transparency. These findings suggest that it is more accurate to identify the 
transparency turn as a consequence of, and influence on, democratization 
understood more generally as discursive or deliberative modes of social 
coordination (Dryzek 2010). Shorn of its association with liberal democratic 
state forms, this shifts methodological attention to the specific engagement of 
public discourses and their application to those public or private authority 
holders responsible for producing significant harm or risks (Mason 2005). 
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Florini and Jairaj also view democratization in such broader 
institutional terms, noting that information disclosure tends to gain traction in 
societies and political systems broadly hospitable to the idea of transparency, 
including where civil society is sufficiently autonomous to call for, and act on, 
disclosed information. This holds as well for transnational scalings of civil 
society action: . The the contributions on multilateral rule makingrulemaking 
in Part part II 2 thus identify NGOs and activist coalitions as triggers for 
information disclosure in global regulation of pesticides and genetic resource 
flows (although this was not the case for GMOs and REDD+, where 
disclosure is being pushed for by developing and developed countries, 
respectively). Civil society actors are similarly often the catalysts for 
information disclosure as a means of enlarging communication (and 
sometimes participation) on issues of collective concern in the cases of 
horizontal disclosure-based governance explored in Part part III3. Salient 
examples here include the Publish What You Pay Campaign campaign (Van 
Alstine), the Carbon Disclosure Project (Knox-Hayes and Levy), and 
transparency policies within the International Finance Corporation (Ehresman 
and Stevis).  
Yet this general trend hides important differences in institutional 
practice. In chapter 12, Auld and Gulbrandsen report that while although civil 
society pressure prompted the adoption of environmental certification 
schemes, and the Forest Stewardship Council carried through a commitment to 
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open, and inclusive deliberation in environmental standard- setting, this 
democratic imperative was displaced in the Marine Stewardship Council by a 
technocratic preference for expert-led governance. This is akin to the techno-
statist imperative for disclosure in global pesticide governance identified by 
Jansen and Dubois in chapter 5.as well, in their chapter 5 in their analysis 
ofwhich they analyzeing global pesticide governance by disclosure. 
At the same time, many contributors to this volume book concur that 
marketization represents a dominant driver of information disclosure regimes 
within global environmental governance. By marketization, we refer to 
market-based mechanisms of resource allocation and attendant ideological 
discourses justifying market liberalization as the default setting for collective 
choices. Market liberalism, which has globally reasserted itself after the 2008 
financial crisis, remains the dominant political doctrine and economic project 
privileging market-based solutions to environmental challenges. 
Across the chapters in this volumebook, there is a striking presence of 
market liberal political interests. In the cases of state-mediated governance, 
market liberalism justifies: the exclusion of private businesses from direct 
information disclosure obligations (Aarhus Convention); ), the dilution of 
prior informed consent (PIC) norms (global governance of pesticides and 
GMOs); ), and the use of commercial confidentiality to block public access to 
information (bioprospecting). There are also demands for disclosure issuing 
from market-based actors, typically in response to perceived costs and benefits 
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arising from the management of environment-related risks (Clapp and 
Helleiner 2012, 492–493). Thus, marketization tends to favor environmental 
information disclosure where when it assists private investment decisions 
(Global Reporting Initiative, Carbon Disclosure Project, International Finance 
Corporation), reinforces intellectual property rights (environmental 
certification, genetic resources), and facilitates the commodification of 
environmental resources (REDD+). The spread of market-led transparency is 
not of course predetermined: ; however, there is a high level of consent and 
acquiescence (hegemony) to political, economic, and discursive forces 
favoring marketization as a development path. 
The tension between democratic and market-based pressures for 
disclosure of environmental information reflects wider processes of economic 
globalization and their socio-ecological impacts. Global networks of 
production, trade, and investment create what Dingwerth and Eichinger 
(chapter 10) label “markets for transparency” to facilitate the 
commodification of environmental information flows. Yet, at the same time, 
the transboundary pathways of environmental risk and harm generated by 
global interdependence drain legitimacy from states unable to protect their 
populations: multilateral transparency initiatives thus become one collective 
response to help address deficits in environmental regulation. 
This interplay between private and public authority accounts, we 
argue, for the double-sided character of the transparency turn in global 
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environmental governance. On the one hand, environmental disclosure 
regimes are embraced as market- facilitating, correcting for market 
inefficiencies and creating new markets by valuing previously unrewarded 
ecosystem resources or services (e.g., genetic resources, or forest carbon 
stocks); on the other hand, they serve market-forcing demands for legitimation 
in the face of perceived accountability deficits (e.g., extractive industries 
transparency, and environmental certification schemes). The contradictory 
imperatives here reflect an innate tension between the marketization and the 
democratization of environmental responsibility—one played out in political 
negotiations and struggles over the appropriate governance role for 
transparency. 
Institutionalizing Transparency 
It would be surprising if there were no connection between the broader 
societal drivers just highlighted above and the means by which global 
transparency and disclosure initiatives have been institutionalized. The 
information infrastructures detailed in the preceding chapters are, to be sure, 
diverse and often complex: the operational norms and rules structuring 
particular transparency practices have their own dynamics—shaping and 
shaped by immediate contexts of application. Nevertheless, we argue that the 
contributions to this volume book reveal structured patterns of disclosure 
relating to distinctive configurations of actors and institutional practices. More 
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precisely, we find partial validation for our hypothesis (H2) that 
institutionalization of transparency often decenters state-led regulation and 
opens up political space for new civil society and private sector actors. 
However, as we discuss belowin the followingnext, we modify this 
confirmation of H2 to acknowledge the comparative finding that state 
sovereign powers are not necessarily diluted, or weakened, by global 
transparency initiatives. 
The contributors to this volume book examining multilateral disclosure 
regimes observe ways in which transparency qualifies state sovereign 
authority. In one sense, this is no more than the negotiated pooling of 
sovereign powers well- established in public international law, which creates 
state entitlements and duties on the basis of the voluntary consent of parties to 
a treaty. This is evident, for example, from the general access to information 
provisions in the Aarhus Convention, and the more specific disclosure rules on 
chemicals and genetic resources in, respectively, the Rotterdam Convention 
and biodiversity Biodiversity conventionConvention on Biological Diversity. 
However, a salient trend identified here—one not captured by H2—is a 
transition from soft law to hard law institutional practices, and the role of 
various international organizations (including UN agencies) in selling 
transparency to state actors. There were voluntary guidelines and codes 
preceding the establishment of hard law disclosure regimes in all three 
multilateral environmental agreements just mentioned above, although this 
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was not the case with information disclosure for trade in GMOs—covered by a 
different protocol under the biodiversity Biodiversity conventionConvention 
on Biological Diversity—where in which contentious, protracted negotiations 
have resulted in very limited mandatory disclosure rules. Van Alstine similarly 
shows in chapter 11 how the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
prompted the Ghanaian government to institutionalize mandatory transparency 
in domestic legislation on the oil industry. These findings corroborate the 
claim that non-binding soft law institutions are a favored vehicle for ambitious 
environmental norms, which, depending on growing internal credibility and/or 
external political support, are then converted into hard law rules (Skjærseth et 
al. 2006). 
From the chapters, it is evident that the propensity of states to adopt 
multilateral transparency norms and rules reflects their sensitivity to perceived 
domestic and external impacts on sovereign authority, constituting what we 
label a geopolitics of information disclosure that reflects power differentials 
within and between developed and developing countries. A prominent 
institutional logic is the external promotion by developed countries of 
transparency norms and rules with high political and policy currency in their 
domestic contexts. This is reflected, for example, in the uptake of pollutant 
release and transfer registers under the Aarhus Convention and the diffusion of 
transparency mechanisms obligations compatible with market liberal property 
rights in global regulatory negotiations on genetic resources and GMOs. 
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Outside Beyond multilateral environmental agreements, there is also the US- 
and European-led instillation of transparency as a good governance norm in 
global energy governance (chapter 11) and the International Finance 
Corporation (chapter 13). Both chapters reveal that international organizations 
can effectively promote information disclosure practices to domestic 
governments (typically from the global South), though this is less likely if 
such organizations are perceived by target audiences as lacking governance 
competence or credibility (Bauhr and Nasiritousi 2012). 
In By contrast, many developing countries resist information- 
disclosure obligations that impinge on their sovereign authority over natural 
resources and on their domestic regulatory space. In their chapter on the 
measuring, reporting, and verification (MRV) systems under development 
within the REDD+ provisions of the climate change convention, Gupta and 
colleagues cite China’s opposition, in these terms, to general third-party 
review and validation of its voluntarily assumed carbon -mitigation activities, 
and Brazil’s opposition to international verification of its REDD+ -related 
claims and activities. Furthermore, poorer developing countries may be unable 
to renegotiate, contest, or apply multilaterally negotiated stringent MRV 
standards because of capacity constraints.  
Environmental disclosure rules within multilateral treaties sometimes 
acknowledge these inequalities and, at least in principle, facilitate 
technological and financial assistance, as well as differentiated obligations. 
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Jansen and Dubois highlight this for the Rotterdam Convention, which 
features a less burdensome notification procedure for developing countries in 
bringing hazardous imported pesticides under the treaty’s PIC procedure. 
Similarly, developing countries with major genetic resources are favored by 
the PIC rules of the Nagoya Protocol to the biodiversity Biodiversity 
conventionConvention on Biological Diversity—in this case, obliging 
resource users (typically private corporations from developed countries) to 
provide information on the agreed legal and commercial terms of their access. 
Orsini et al. (chapter 7) view the negotiation of such information disclosure as 
evidence that developing countries are asserting sovereign control over the use 
of their genetic resources, questioning the premise of H2 that the 
institutionalization of transparency in global environmental governance 
necessarily decenters state-led regulation. Nevertheless, the hypothesis still 
carries explanatory weight, they argue, because key disclosure provisions on 
the origin of genetic resources are non-binding. 
Contestation over PIC norms and rules is arguably the key flashpoint 
for the geopolitics of environmental information disclosure, though the 
alignment of national interests varies with the issue- area. For example, the 
governance -by- disclosure regime for trade in GMOs, negotiated under the 
Cartagena Protocol to the biodiversityConvention on Biological Diversity 
Biodiversity conventionConvention, has pitted leading GMO exporters (for 
e.g.example,including the United States, Canada, Australia, and Argentina) 
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against bulk agricultural commodity importers in both developed and 
developing countries. Here the operative PIC norm of “advance informed 
agreement” navigates geopolitically between the two groups, although poorer 
developing countries are again at a disadvantage relative to the mature 
transparency and regulatory infrastructure of the European Union and Japan. 
Indeed, Gupta concludes in chapter 6 that the incomplete minimal disclosure 
obligations of the Cartagena Protocol benefit least those who might need them 
the most. 
The institutionalization of transparency through PIC norms and rules 
demonstrates as well how private authority inflects multilateral disclosure 
arrangements. Thus, information disclosure relating to the utilization use of 
genetic resources is, according to Orsini and colleagues, ultimately about the 
regulation of private market actors as users, while and at the same time 
deferring to a market liberal logic protective of their intellectual property 
rights. A similar truncation of disclosure duties for relevant private actors is 
evident in the governance of pesticides and transgenic crops: in both cases, the 
political mobilization of agro-corporate interests has significantly influenced 
the formulation of mandatory disclosure obligations. To recall the 
marketization process previously mentioned above, the market-facilitating, 
rather than market-forcing, institutionalization of disclosure is also structurally 
favored by a global political economy underpinned by market liberal norms, 
such as non-discrimination in trade and investment, and the caveat emptor (let 
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the buyer beware) dictum. Additional evidence for this in PIC regimes relates 
to the use of commercial confidentiality opt-outs by market producers to 
restrict public information to, at best, that which is already available. 
For the chapters in Part part II 2 addressing horizontal forms of 
disclosure where in which non-state actors play a lead role, the marketization 
process is omnipresent, as we noted earlierpreviously, in driving the uptake of 
transparency, with consequences for its institutionalization. Within these 
governance initiatives, transparency is a means of correcting those 
informational deficits or asymmetries that lead to environmental goods and 
services not being accorded a “socially optimal” market valuation. Surveying 
a variety of governance forms, these contributions record document how the 
institutionalization of non-financial reporting on environmental and social 
impacts is being institutionalized, and how it is, offsetting significant political 
pressure for state-led regulation.  
Arguably, the dominant institutional logic across these case studies is 
the key role of non-state intermediaries in managing and/or validating 
information disclosure, confirming H2 on the significant governance role for 
new actors. In the chapter 13 by Ehresman and Stevis, the intermediary is an 
intergovernmental organization (the International Finance Corporation) 
applying transparency to its internal social and environmental standards. These 
standards feature public disclosure of environmental and social information by 
private sector clients, including requirements to engage with the affected 
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communities of proposed investment projects. Van Alstine similarly 
demonstrates the role of NGOs in deepening global transparency about 
financial transfers in the extractive industries sector. In the cases of voluntary 
non-financial reporting, covered by the Global Reporting Initiative, the 
Carbon Disclosure Project, and non-state certification schemes (the Forest 
Stewardship Council and Marine Stewardship Council), there is on-going 
bargaining between non-state rule- makers and corporate disclosers over the 
quantity and quality of disclosed information. One example is the tension 
between the information comparability goal of the Global Reporting Initiative 
and the discretion allowed enabledpermitted to companies to incentivize their 
self-reporting. Similarly, Auld and Gulbrandsen note, in chapter 12, the trade-
offs involved in the difficult political steering between buy-in of corporate 
disclosers and public credibility of the host schemes.  Both tThe FSC and 
MSC delegate assurance/-accreditation roles to independent auditors, who in 
turn face self-regarding pressures not to antagonize participating businesses. 
There is also a trend for non-financial reporting to become commodified: the 
Carbon Disclosure Project and Global Reporting Initiative have, directly or 
indirectly (via commercial intermediaries), generated paywalls (i.e., barriers to 
accessing webpage content without payment) behind which enhanced 
interpretive products are available, weakening their public transparency 
claims. 





In summary, the contributions to this volume book reveal the complex 
configurations of public and private authority structuring the 
institutionalization of transparency in global environmental governance. 
Governance by disclosure encompasses public (mandatory) initiatives 
conditioned by market liberal interests and private (voluntary) disclosure 
under the shadow of hierarchy, even as both sources of authority are shaped to 
a greater or lesser degree by civil society actors. This is in line with an 
important ongoing debate that questions a sharply drawn public/-private divide 
in global environmental governance processes and outcomes (e.g., Pattberg 
and Stripple 2008).  
However, across the cases, greater disclosure of environmental 
information faces recurring barriers from what is regarded by power- holders 
as the legitimate, limited scope of transparency under liberal 
environmentalism—notably, more openness from state actors than private 
actors, respect for private property rights, and a deference to commercial 
confidentiality. These limits are continually challenged by proponents of 
greater environmental transparency, drawing who claim moral authority from 
well-established expectations of democratic accountability. Furthermore, 
despite technological advances in information availability and processing, 
there are still significant deficits and uncertainties impairing the generation of 
environmental information. We claim, nevertheless, that the partial 
transparency evident from the institutionalization of governance by disclosure 
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studied in this volume book is delimited more by political-economic rather 
than by technical markers. 
Effects of Transparency 
In the introduction to this volumebook, we presented as an overarching goal 
the analysis of the transformative impacts of governance by disclosure. To 
assess this systematically, we proposed a broad typology of effectiveness in 
order to capture a range of (potential) effects issuing from transparency as 
information disclosure—normative, procedural, and substantive. This 
conception reflects the critical theoretical stance of the book by 
acknowledging that disclosure practices are arenas of socio-political 
negotiation and are inherently normative, whether or not relevant actors make 
this explicit. Our selection of H3 as a hypothesis for this volume book 
reflected existing scholarship, positing that transparency is more likely to be 
effective under contexts resonant with the goals and decision processes of both 
both disclosers and recipients (e.g., Fung et al. 2007; Hood and Heald 2006; 
Mitchell 2011; see also Mol, this volumebook, chapter 2). However, consistent 
with our critical theoretical approach, we presented a directional version of H3 
as well—that in liberal environmental contexts, transparency, if adopted, will 
have minimal market-restricting effects. We highlight below in the following 
section the major chapter findings on the transformative potential of 
transparency, by discussing the three types ofnormative, procedural and 
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substantive effectiveness of disclosure-based governance—normative, 
procedural, and substantive. 
Normative Effects 
As anticipated in our introduction, the most common normative goal 
underpinning the governance- by- disclosure initiatives examined in this 
volume book is the “right to know,” addressed mainly to civil society 
recipients, but also directed at states and corporate actors. For individuals (as 
citizens or consumers), the moral authority infusing the right to know echoes, 
as Mol notes in chapter 2, its affiliation with concepts of democracy and 
participation. Its strongest legal expression in global environmental 
governance is the access- to- information entitlement under the Aarhus 
Convention, where it attains the status of a universal human right with a non-
discriminatory application in all convention parties. While Although the right- 
to -know also features prominently in the other examples of governance by 
disclosure examined here, it is either: restricted to national settings (e.g., 
domestic right-to-know laws); ), subsumed within state-endowed treaty 
entitlements and the policy prescriptions of an international agency; , or 
facilitated in actor- and sector-specific domains by civil society organizations.  
Across all these manifestations—including Aarhus rights—the right to know 
provides a significant asset for political claims by citizens and states, but tends 
to be restrained or diluted by countervailing moral and legal norms, unsettling 
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its governance legitimacy. The most potent of such norms are those 
underpinning the private authority of actors in market liberal systems of 
resource allocation; thus, the cases reveal that right to know is countered by 
norms of corporate voluntarism (Aarhus Convention, non-financial reporting 
systems), intellectual property rights (pesticides, genetic resources), and the 
caveat emptor (let the “buyer beware”) dictum (GMOs). Moreover, while 
although state sovereign norms are sometimes utilized used to challenge 
market actors to reveal more—e.g.for example, the assertion of sovereign 
natural resource rights by developing countries in benefit sharing fromover 
genetic resources, as discussed in the ABS chapter—they can also be invoked 
to oppose environmental disclosure requests, as observed in the chapter on 
REDD+ MRV systems. In summary, while although right- to- know serves as 
a widely accepted normative justification of for information disclosure in 
global environmental governance, its legal application tends to be 
compromised by the political deployment of market liberal or state sovereign 
norms. This comparative finding confirms, for the case studies featured in this 
volumebook, the directional version of H3 as in regardswith  regard to the 
normative effects of transparency. 
Procedural Effects 
When inviting contributors to consider the procedural effects of transparency, 
we emphasized governance by disclosure as due process—the openness, 
Formatted: Font: Italic
 602 
inclusiveness, and impartiality conferred or facilitated by disclosure—with the 
aim being not only to inform, but also to empower. Procedural goals of 
disclosure include, as we suggested in the introduction, empowering 
information recipients to perform meaningful governance roles, notably 
holding disclosers accountable and making choices that are more informed. 
These two facets are connected, thus the procedural quality of information 
disclosure co-determines intended procedural outcomes. Here we single out 
the most salient cross--chapter comparative finding—: the limitations to the 
sustained empowerment of intended information recipients in global 
environmental governance, which holds both for civil society and state actors. 
This means that the symmetry in goals and decision- processes between 
disclosers and recipients assumed by H3 is not sustained, resulting in no clear 
validation of this hypothesis for procedural effectiveness. While Although the 
transparency initiatives studied have delivered procedural openings tailored to 
particular disclosure contexts, these gains seem not to have led, as elaborated 
further belowin the following we argue subsequently, to significant 
empowerment gains for information recipients. 
For civil society recipients of environmental transparency in national 
regulatory contexts, information is typically seen as a means to realize 
communicative and accountability gains vis-à-vis particular wielders of 
power, as chapter 3 by Florini and Jairaj shows. Of course, this linkage 
between transparency and public accountability is more problematic for global 
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environmental governance, where in which state sovereignty and higher 
information costs present major obstacles to civil society recipients of 
information seeking to hold foreign actors to account for transboundary 
environmental harm. Again, the Aarhus Convention has arguably made the 
greatest legal progress in ensuring transnational public entitlements to 
environmental information and non-compliance notifications, as a way of 
empowermentto empower through the conferral of procedural rights. Yet, as 
argued by Mason, there have been repeated procedural blockages by 
convention parties to public information requests, and this opposition is often 
justified in relation to the discretion allowed parties when implementing treaty 
obligations. The formal procedural rights for the public created by the Aarhus 
Convention are not mirrored, according to the research featured in this 
volumebook, in those disclosure regimes under the biodiversity and climate 
conventions facilitating the provision of information on different types of 
transboundary environmental risk. 
Procedural shortcomings concerning access to information by civil 
society actors are also apparent from the chapters on global disclosure 
initiatives led by non-state actors. In their contribution, Ehresman and Stevis 
identify room for improvement in the engagement of affected communities 
under the sustainability and disclosure policies of the International Finance 
Corporation. In the chapters on voluntary non-financial reporting and product 
certification, civil society actors are either a primary or a secondary recipient 
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of information. The shared rhetoric across these regimes that disclosure is at 
least partly a means of public accountability thus falls short in practice. Across 
the Global Reporting Initiative, Carbon Disclosure Project, and environmental 
certification schemes, there are weaknesses in public participation both at the 
systemic governance level, and in terms of the usability of information for 
making accountability claims against disclosers. For example, while although 
procedural openness is lauded in the transparency infrastructure of the Marine 
Stewardship Council, Auld and Gulbrandsen identify a closed decision-
making structure and non-transparent accreditation process: this reduces 
opportunities for outsiders to hold the rule- makers and disclosers to account. 
There are good reasons to expect greater procedural effects when states 
are environmental information recipients. These include the formal equality of 
treatment bestowed on sovereign states by multilateral rule- making and the 
extensive currency of disclosure norms in international environmental law, 
encompassing obligations upon states to exchange information, notify, 
consult, seek consent, and monitor (Louka 2006, pp. 120–126, see also 
Mitchell 1998). Rational choice theorists of environmental treaty- making 
posit, in addition, that states have self-interest in fostering information 
disclosure as an efficient means of distinguishing cheaters from co-operators 
(Barrett 2003, pp. 269–291). It is thus rational for states with mature 
“governance- by- disclosure” capacity to support capacity- building of 
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disclosure systems in poorer countries, thus generating credible data 
concerning transboundary environmental problems or improvements.  
Several chapters in this collection identify such activities, including 
within the Rotterdam Convention, the biodiversity Biodiversity 
conventionConvention on Biological Diversity, and REDD+ MRV discussions 
within the climate change convention. What is striking, then, is the shared 
evaluation of authors that there has been little empowerment of poorer 
developing countries in terms of their capacity to generate and/or receive 
information flows prescribed by the selected multilateral environmental 
treaties. This holds for global governance of pesticide flows, GMOs, genetic 
resources, and forest carbon accounting for REDD+: each case study provides 
evidence of an unfair onus, placed de facto on poorer developing countries, to 
establish institutional frameworks for transparency conducive to the efficient 
implementation of relevant disclosure norms. A common reason for the under-
attainment of informational equity between states seems to be the 
disproportionate bargaining power of states (including emerging economies 
such as China, India, and Brazil) representing producer or extractive interests, 
and whose actions generate and entrench particular informational 
asymmetries. 
It is noteworthy that developing countries lose out regardless of the 
category of state -soliciting information, and regardless of differences in the 
materiality of the environmental resources concerned. In the GMO case, 
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involving mainly industrialized countries (GMO exporters) disclosing to 
potential importers largely located within developing countries, the latter—as 
recipients—have not secured requested levels of transparency. In the case of 
REDD+, certain developing countries will struggle to disclose required 
environmental information to industrialized countries, in their capacity as 
donors. Moreover, in access and benefit sharing over relating to genetic 
resources, where for whichwhereby access requires calls for disclosure from 
developing countries; and benefit- sharing calls for disclosure from developed 
countries, poorer states have been doubly disadvantaged by the 
institutionalization of transparency that favors quicker establishment of access 
versus benefit- sharing infrastructures. Whether developing countries are 
seeking disclosure or are required to disclose, the geopolitics of transparency 
reveals unequal structures of power harming their interests. 
Substantive Effects 
To recall from our introduction, governance by disclosure also includes 
substantive regulatory goals, such as reduced pollution emissions, risk 
mitigation, or conservation of biodiversity. The direct substantive effect often 
attributed by proponents of disclosure processes is that sharing of information 
will render producers of environmental damage or risk more responsive to 
regulatory pressures. For global environmental governance, where in which 
substantive regulatory aims converge on the prevention and mitigation of 
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significant transnational harm, which that must be appraised according to local 
vulnerabilities and values, this is this is a heavy behavioral burden to is 
placedto place on communicative processes. In these circumstances, the 
absence of substantive environmental standards in the procedure-centered 
Aarhus Convention is no surprise. Yet, as we also find, Nor can multilateral 
disclosure initiatives aiming to mitigate specific environmental problems also 
fail to avoid this burden. A revealing finding of this volume book is how little 
evaluation there is within the global disclosure initiatives  as toonof  their 
impact on environmental processes or outcomes. Despite the rhetoric 
accompanying disclosure initiatives about their potential to improve 
environmental outcomes or generate other substantive effects, assessing 
whether this is being achieved is not prioritized and/or little evidence is being 
generated about this substantive impacts within the initiatives themselves. 
 Multilateral environmental agreements are certainly animated by harm- 
prevention goals, as outlined in the case analyses of disclosure-based global 
governance of pesticides, GMOs, genetic resources, and forestry-related 
climate mitigation activities. Yet there are negligible treaty-based data sources 
on the environmental effects of the relevant disclosure measures, for reasons 
that include evaluative uncertainties (genetic resources), measurement 
difficulties (REDD+), and a preoccupation with trade effects rather than 
environmental outcomes (pesticides). It is instructive that, in the GMO 
examplecase, various countries have bypassed the Cartagena Protocol by 
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opting for unilateral moratoria or bans to achieve environmental and health 
protection goals. 
In the voluntary realm of (non)financial reporting systems, which focus 
on managerial processes, the evidence on substantive environmental 
effectiveness is also slight. Dingwerth and Eichinger note the rising number of 
corporate reports registered under the Global Reporting Initiative, but caution 
that lack of data specificity and comparability prevents any meaningful 
assessment of environmental performance patterns. Knox- Hayes and Levy 
reach the same conclusion in relation to carbon disclosure systems that, they 
claim, do not appear to be shifting core product or marketing strategies in a 
low-carbon direction. The revenue transparency initiatives examined by Van 
Alstine are not directly geared to reducing environmental harm or risk: it is 
notable, however, that the contract transparency they promote has, so far, not 
led to voluntary or mandatory disclosure on environmental effects in the oil 
and gas industryindustries. 
Of the various other voluntary disclosure systems studied in this 
volumebook, non-state environmental certification schemes provide the most 
detailed information on the environmental impacts of disclosed corporate 
practices. Auld and Gulbrandsen label this “outcome transparency,” which in 
principle captures both regulated and unregulated behaviors causing relevant 
environmental effects, thereby enabling a systematic evaluation of product 
certification. Their careful study of the Forest Stewardship Council and 
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Marine Stewardship Council shows that, even here, major challenges remain 
in connecting disclosure with actual improvements in environmental 
performance—for example, by tracking substantive environmental effects over 
time. As with mandatory governance by disclosure, the monitoring and 
analysis of environmental outcomes by voluntary disclosure systems is still in 
its infancy. 
In summary, there is insufficient evidence from the case studies on this 
category of effects to confirm H3—that global transparency initiatives have 
greater environmental effectiveness where when governance contexts are 
resonant with the goals and decision processes of both both disclosers and 
recipients. That the various governance- by -disclosure initiatives studied here 
have so little self-evaluation of their substantive environmental impacts 
provides prima facie evidence, we argue, that they do not equip those who 
receive such information to make effective accountability claims against 
targeted actors causing significant environmental harm. In a global political 
economy dominated by market liberalism, this seems to offer support to our 
directional version of H3 that transparency has minimal market-restricting 
effects; substantive market-forcing effects are not apparent from the disclosure 
examples analyzed here. Instead, transparency in the service of environmental 
service valuation, commodification or market facilitation, is a more likely 
scenario, as revealed by the genetic resources, forest carbon and GMO 
examples. However, this finding would benefit from more extended 
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comparative analysis, with a stronger methodological focus on mapping 
substantive differentiated environmental effects of specific transparency 
initiatives. 
Conclusion: The (Il)legitimacy of Transparency 
The relatively recent embrace of transparency as a regulatory toolgovernance 
mechanism in the global environmental governance realm cautions against a 
too quick a dismissal of its potential to generate substantive environmental 
improvements. This is also , particularly since because substantive 
effectiveness demonstrates regulatory competence and is therefore an 
important wellspring of political legitimacy. Furthermore, the transformative 
scope of governance by disclosure goes beyond substantive impacts to include 
important normative and procedural effects as well. As shown by the 
contributors to this volumebook, however, these latter effects are being 
circumscribed in practice by market liberal norms. If so, we conclude by 
considering here whether transparency-based governance faces a legitimation 
deficit, fed also byalso given the uncertainty andor lack of evidence relating to 
the environmental effectiveness of governance by disclosure. 
The global transparency turn derives, in part, from a democratization 
impetus to governance, creating expectations among domestic and 
transnational publics that information disclosure will facilitate accountability 
claims against state and non-state actors responsible for producing significant 
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environmental harm or risk. This implies that disclosure-based governance is 
seen as a politically legitimate approach in the global environmental realm. 
Disclosure also fosters political legitimacy insofar as it enriches public 
understanding of what is proper in relation to the collective decisions of 
(potential) harm producers. Here the critical theoretical perspective adopted in 
this book is highly relevant: examining governance by disclosure according to 
its own terms of reference draws attention away from systemic configurations 
of political and economic authority shaping informational entitlements and 
capabilities. In this sense, transparency was never “innocent” of wider 
structures of political and economic power. If so, making clear the situational 
contexts of its use is necessary to securing its emancipatory promise in given 
circumstances. 
Critical theoretical analysis thus seeks to explain the restless dynamic 
between legitimacy and effectiveness and legitimacy associated with 
governance by disclosure. Neither decision-making qualityoutcome admits 
simple methodological access at transnational and global scalings. The 
inadvertent, indirect harm typically associated with transboundary 
environmental problems lends many information disclosure initiatives an air 
of experimentation concerning their intended substantive effects; , and 
legitimacy becomes less feasible when expected from steering mechanisms 
coordinating dispersed decision- makers and affected publics. Furthermore, as 
the contributions to this volume book reveal, there remains a political struggle 
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over the legitimate arenas for disclosure rule making and implementation, 
across diverse contexts and across hybrid configurations of state and non-state 
authority. There are, to be sure, cogent suggestions that increasing 
transparency in both state-led (vertical) and non-state (horizontal) multi-level 
governance can increase political legitimacy, if fed into more inclusive, 
deliberative systems of decision- making (Bernstein and Cashore 2007; 
Dryzek and Stevenson 2011).  
However, it may also be that increasing transparency and information 
disclosure will instead amplify the current legitimation deficits in global 
environmental governance, by locating the systemic sources of harm 
production in broader relations of political and economic power (Newell 
2008). Alternatively, transparency itself may be rendered ever more 
illegitimate as a mechanism of governance, if it takes on forms that belie its 
promise. If that is the case, and the resultYet, if a consequence of this is 
resistance and transformative politics rather than functional effectiveness 
within the strictures of market liberalism, then the democratization driver of 
transparency will be in the ascendantmay well prevail. Whether or not this 
comes to pass, the metamorphosis of transparency as a central tenet of global 
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